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A Downer of a decision: The importance of articulating adjudication submissions

In Diona Pty Ltd v Downer EDI Works Pty Ltd [2020] NSWSC 480 (Diona), the Supreme Court considered an application to set aside an Adjudicator’s Determination for failure to consider the terms of the contract as required by s 22(2)(b) of the Building and Construction Industry Security of Payment Act 1999 (the SOP Act).

Key takeaway:

  • It is important to ensure that adjudication submissions clearly articulate all relevant arguments and contractual provisions. Unclear, poorly framed or ambiguous submissions can be costly.
  • An adjudicator’s decision will not be declared void simply because it contains what one party considers to be an error or failure by the adjudicator to expressly address all arguments made in parties’ submissions.
  • Lawyers can be useful to assist in preparing an adjudication application and response. Having prepared and responded to numerous security of payment claims, the lawyers at Bradbury Legal are experts at ensuring your arguments are clearly articulated.

 

Background

Diona Pty Ltd (Diona) entered into a subcontract with Downer EDI Works Pty Ltd (Downer), for Downer to provide works in relation to safety upgrades on the Great Western Highway, Blackheath. Downer proceeded to adjudication on a payment claim under the SOP Act. On 16 April 2020, the relevant Adjudicator determined that Downer was entitled to a progress payment of $430,990.13 (Determination).

Diona made an application to the Supreme Court, seeking a declaration that the Determination was void and an injunction preventing Downer from requesting an adjudication certificate or filing the adjudication certificate as a judgment debt. Diona contended that the Adjudicator had incorrectly awarded a set off claim by Downer, in response to Diona’s liquidated damages claim, in the amount of $30,000 on account of two extension of time claims (EOT Claims).

Diona argued that the Adjudicator had not fulfilled the requirements of s 22(2)(b) of the SOP Act because the Adjudicator had failed to give any reference to, or consideration of, Diona’s contention in its adjudication response submissions that Downer was not entitled to these extensions of time, due to the operation of a time bar in the contract.

 

Did the Adjudicator consider the time bars?

The central question was whether the Adjudicator considered the provisions of the contract. Under section 22(2)(b) SOP Act, an adjudicator must consider the provisions of the construction contract.

To determine if the Adjudicator did consider the contractual provisions, especially those containing the time bar, the Court looked at the submissions made by both parties and the Adjudicator’s determination.

The Court noted that Downer had ‘devoted a number of pages to its contentions concerning extension of time and, in particular, its asserted entitlement to EOT 18 and EOT 21’. This was contrasted with Diona’s submissions, the Court found did not properly engage with Downer’s EOT Claims. Diona’s submissions stated:

Determinations of claims for…extension of time…by Diona are final and cannot be disturbed except by raising a Claim under the Contract, see relevant clauses of the Subcontract.’

The Court highlighted a part of the Adjudicator’s reasons which stated:

The Act at section 22(2)(b) requires the adjudicator to consider the provisions of the construction contract when making the determination

Having regard to the Adjudicator’s express reference to s 22(2)(b) of the SOP Act, the Court stated that there were several reasons why the Adjudicator did not refer to the dispute clause in the Determination. Firstly, the Adjudicator may have felt that Diona did not properly articulate and develop the time bar argument. Alternatively, the Adjudicator may have misunderstood the submissions. The Court concluded that:

The Adjudicator may have come to the wrong decision about Dower’s entitlement to EOT 18 and EOT 21. But that, without more, is not a basis to set aside the set aside the determination.

The argument that Diona sought to raise, while potentially valid, was not properly articulated. Therefore, it could not be inferred that the Adjudicator had failed to consider the provisions of the subcontract as required by s 22(2)(b) of the SOP Act.

 

So what?

The significance of this case is that it shows that what appear to be errors or failures to consider an argument by an adjudicator will not always result in a basis to set aside the adjudicator’s determination. The adjudicator’s decision can be rough and ready, provided the adjudicator makes their decision in accordance with the SOP Act. Payments made under SOP Act are on account only and may be determined on a final basis at a later stage.

 

A tale of two Acts

Last week the NSW Parliament passed two significant pieces of legislation for the construction industry. The first, passed on Tuesday 3 June 2020, was the Design and Building Practitioners Bill 2019 (at the time of writing, awaiting assent). The second, passed on 4 June 2020, was the Residential Apartment Buildings (Compliance and Enforcement Powers) Bill 2020 (which will commence on 1 September 2020).

Design and Building Practitioners Act 2020 (the DBP Act)

The DBP Act sets up a legislative regime which regulates design practitioners who provide designs for certain types of building works.

The DBP Act introduces a number of new regulatory provisions in relation to:

  • obligations of design practitioners, principal design practitioners and building practitioners;
  • restrictions on carrying out of professional engineering work and specialist work;
  • introduction of a statutory duty of care in favour of owners corporations and associations; and
  • registration, disciplinary action, investigations and enforcement decisions in relation to design practitioners

Important definitions:

The Act introduces several new terms into the law in order to set up the regulatory framework. The most notable definitions are set out below:

Building element means:

  • fire safety systems for a building within the meaning of the Building Code of Australia;
  • waterproofing;
  • an internal or external load-bearing component of a building that is essential to the stability of the building or a part of it;
  • a component of a building that is part of the building enclosure;
  • those aspects of the mechanical, plumbing and electrical services for a building that are required to achieve compliance with the Building Code of Australia;
  • other things prescribed by the regulations.

Design compliance declaration means a declaration as to whether or not:

  • a regulated design prepared for building work complies with the requirements of the Building Code of Australia;
  • the design complies with other applicable requirements prescribed by the regulations;
  • other standards, codes or requirements have been applied in preparing the design.

Essentially, the design compliance declaration confirms that the design practitioner has complied their obligations at law and under contract.

Regulated designs means:

  • a design that is prepared for a building element for building work;
  • a design that is prepared for a performance solution for building work (including a building element); or
  • any other design of a class prescribed by the regulations that is prepared for building work.

Being an incredibly broad definition means that anyone that provides design services, such as engineers, architects and other design consultants, will likely be covered by the DBP Act and therefore subject to its requirements.

Compliance declarations

The DBP Act requires a registered design practitioner and principal design practitioners to provide a compliance declaration to a person if:

  • the practitioner provides the person with a regulated design prepared by the practitioner; and
  • the design is in a form suitable for use by that person or another person in connection with building work.

Failure to comply with the compliance declaration provisions by registered design practitioners can result in fines of up to $165,000 for corporations and $55,000 for other persons. However, if a person makes a design compliance declaration that the person knows to be false or misleading, they could face a fine of up to $220,000, two years imprisonment, or both.

Duty of Care

The DBP Act imposes a duty of care on persons who carry out construction work to exercise reasonable care to avoid economic loss caused by defects:

  • in or related to a building for which the work is done; and
  • arising from the construction work.

The legislation states that this duty of care is owed to each owner of the land that the construction work is carried out. The duty of care also owed to all subsequent owners of the land.

The consequence of this provision is that builders and developers may end up having a duty of care in respect of defects for up to 6 years from the date that the loss was suffered. Builders will also want to consider these potential liabilities in conjunction with the 10 year limitation period for defective building work under the Environmental Protection and Assessment Act. The 10 year period for defective building work commences from the date of completion.

Other things to note with the statutory duty of care:

  • it cannot be delegated;
  • it cannot be contracted out of;
  • it operates in addition to the statutory warranties in the Home Building Act.

Practical considerations:

  • Like the Environmental Protection and Assessment Act, the DBP Act relies on the Regulations to give form and substance to many of the operative provisions of the DBP Act. At the time of writing, the Regulations for the DBP Act were not available for review.
  • Design professionals and head contractors will need to update their insurances to ensure they are compliant with the new provisions and duties of design professionals.
  • Builders and others that engage in construction work will now have a much greater duty of care to the land owners.

Residential Apartment Buildings (Compliance and Enforcement Powers) Act 2020 (the RAB Act)

The RAB Act is more restricted in its application, applying only to residential apartment buildings. The purpose of this legislation is to prevent developers from carrying out building work that might result in serious defects to building work or result in significant harm or loss to the public, current occupiers and future occupiers of the building.

Notification for intended completion

From 1 September 2020, developers will be required to provide the Secretary of the Department of Customer Service a notification that they expect completion to occur and an occupation certificate issued within 6 – 12 months from the application. The Secretary is given the ability to make orders prohibiting the issue of an occupation certificate in relation to residential apartment buildings and may prevent the registration of a strata plan for a strata scheme in certain circumstances.

Investigations

The RAB Act authorises the following people to carry out investigations:

  • Building Commission;
  • an employee of the Department of Customer Service;
  • investigators under the Fair Trading Act 1979;
  • a council investigation officer under the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979; and
  • a person set out in the regulations of the RAB Act.

These authorised officers are given various information gathering powers including being able to request information or records from persons where it is connected with an authorised purpose. Further, an authorised officer is able to enter premises without the need for a search warrant and will be able to undertake actions including:

  • examine and inspect any thing;
  • take and remove samples of a thing;
  • take photographs or other recordings that the authorised officer considers necessary;
  • copy of any records; and
  • seize a thing that the authorised officer has reasonable grounds for believing is connected with an offence against the RAB Act or its regulations or a serious defect in a building.

These powers are extensive and serious. Builders and developers should be seek legal advice. The Secretary for Customer Service is also empowered to issue stop work orders and rectification orders. Failure to comply with these orders may result the Secretary taking any action necessary or convenient to ensure the order is complied with. The cost of these actions are then able to be recovered by the Secretary.

Practical considerations:

  • Developers are required to give at least 6 months’ notice (but no more than 12 months) before an application is made for an occupation certificate.
  • Developers and builders should seek legal advice as to their rights in respect of the RAB Act. The powers of the authorised officers are extensive and the consequences for breach are serious.

Summary

The DBP Act and the RAB Act represent a major regulatory change from the NSW Parliament which will have serious consequences for building professionals. While these legislative reforms are aimed at promoting confidence in the building industry in light of developments such as Mascot Towers and Opal Tower, they radically shift the current status quo for building professionals. Those who carry out building work, from consultants and designers to builders and developers should seek specific legal advice as to where they stand in respect to these new legislative regimes.

Case article – Brolton Group Pty Ltd v Hanson Construction Materials Pty Ltd

In Brolton Group Pty Ltd v Hanson Construction Materials Pty Ltd [2020] NSWCA 63 (Brolton), the NSW Court of Appeal considered the jurisdictional and procedural fairness grounds of an adjudicator’s determination.

Background

Brolton was contracted by Hanson to build a quarry processing plant at Bass Point. The parties agreed on a guaranteed maximum price of $85 million (excluding GST) in which Brolton was entitled to claim monthly progress payments on the last Tuesday of each month. Hanson claimed liquidated damages and the contract was eventually terminated on 3 October 2018. In August 2019, Brolton served a payment claim on Hanson. The payment claim claimed work up to September 2018 as well as interest on unpaid amounts to August 2019. The adjudicator determined in favour of Brolton, issuing an adjudication amount of $2,877,052.75. Hanson challenged the decision in the Supreme Court, with the Supreme Court finding in favour of Hanson. This resulted in the appeal by Brolton to the NSW Court of Appeal.

The Court’s decision

Brolton raised two main grounds of appeal. The first and most pertinent issue, concerning jurisdiction, centred predominantly on the availability of a reference date on which Brolton could make its payment claim.
Importance of jurisdiction and the trouble of jurisdictional error
Under the Building and Construction Industry Security of Payment Act 1999 (NSW) (SOP Act) section 22, an adjudicator is given the statutory authority to determine the amount of a progress payment, the date on which such amount became payable and the rate of interest payable on any such amount. The importance of section 22 is that it sets out the jurisdiction of an adjudicator. As the saying goes, with great power comes great responsibility. While the adjudicator is given the power to make these determinations, section 22 sets out the limited factors that the adjudicator can consider. These are the responsibility components of the adjudicator’s determination. Two of the relevant factors to consider in Brolton was the provisions of the SOP Act and the payment claim.
While adjudicators are given the power to make determinations, they can only do so in certain circumstances or if there are specified preconditions. In the legal world, this is called a ‘jurisdictional fact’. As Gleeson JA described in Brolton (at paragraph 28), the term jurisdictional fact is used to describe ‘any precondition which a statute requires to exist in order for the decision-maker to embark on the decision-making process’. Jurisdictional facts fall into two types:

1. The existence of an identified state of affairs; or
2. A state of satisfaction of the decision-maker as to an identified state of affairs.

A jurisdictional fact gives a decision-maker the power to make the decision. If it exists, then an adjudicator can make a determination. In this way, the reference date activates the adjudicators powers to make a determination under the SOP Act.
Under the SOP Act, a claimant is only able to make a payment claim when there is a reference date under the construction contract. Therefore, the existence of a reference date is a jurisdictional fact that falls into the first category. This is because the existence or non-existence of a reference date is objective and does not depend on whether the adjudicator is satisfied that a reference date exists. Where an adjudicator exercises its power, but the jurisdictional fact does not actually exist, the adjudicator has made a jurisdictional error..
Getting back to the case, in submitting its payment claim, Brolton claimed in its adjudication submissions that the reference dates for August 2018 and September 2018 were available for the payment claim. Hanson also contended that the September 2018 reference date was available for the progress payment. However, the adjudicator ‘went rogue’ and determined that the reference date was in fact 23 October 2018. There were a few issues with this. Firstly, the 23 October 2018 was not the last Tuesday of the month (which in fact was 30 October 2018). Secondly, the contract had been terminated on 3 October 2018, meaning no further reference dates arose. As the clause entitling Brolton to a progress payment did not continue beyond the termination of the contract, the adjudicator had made a jurisdictional error. The reference date the adjudicator relied on did not exist, and therefore the determination was void and the $2.8 million decision was overturned (as if it had never been made).

Although Hanson succeeded on the first issue, the Court was still minded to consider the second issue on appeal. The second issue concerned the procedural fairness of the adjudicator’s decision. Like jurisdiction, procedural fairness is a legal term that has important consequences for adjudication determinations. Procedural fairness is an aspect of natural justice, a foundational legal principal that sets the standards of how people are to exercise their authority. The concept of procedural fairness means the process in which a decision is made should be just. Procedural fairness requires that parties have the right or opportunity to have their case heard by the decision-maker. If there is a substantial denial of natural justice, the decision-maker’s determination will be void. In this case, the issue of procedural fairness arose because the adjudicator determined that the relevant reference date was a date not submitted by either party. Brolton argued that while procedural fairness was denied to the parties, it was immaterial and should not void the adjudicator’s decision. The Court found that the findings by the adjudicator were a material breach of procedural fairness and therefore there was a breach of natural justice.

Take-away points

While this article has discussed a few technical legal concepts, the main take away points from Brolton are that:
• A progress payment must be linked to a specific reference date. If an adjudicator incorrectly attributes a payment claim to a reference date which does not exist, the determination will be void.
• It is not enough that another reference date is available for the payment claim to be linked to. If the adjudicator goes rogue and determines a reference date not submitted by the parties, the decision will be void.
• Claimants should identify and make it abundantly clear the relevant reference date to which a payment claim relates and make submissions in the adjudication application as to what the relevant reference date is.
• Reference dates are essential for an adjudicator to make a determination. A failure by the adjudicator to appropriately determine a reference date can have dire consequences to claimants.
• Note: The recent amendments to the NSW SOP Act have eliminated the post-termination payment claim issue. Section 13(1C) now states that for construction contracts that have been terminated, a payment claim may be served on and from the date of termination. This change will only apply to contracts entered into after 21 October 2019.

ADR Processes Part II

This article is Part II of our article on ADR process. In this article, we will be covering the common pitfalls of ADR clauses. In Part I, we discussed the different types of ADR processes that are common in construction law matters. You can find Part I of our article HERE. While there are benefits to ADR processes, the drafting of dispute resolution clauses can sometimes result in the clause being void and unenforceable. Alternatively, there are times where the drafting of the dispute resolution clause means parties are left with a result under the contract which is unfair or unjust in the relevant circumstances. Often dispute resolution clauses are thrown into a contract without the parties giving much thought or consideration as to its enforceability or suitability to the circumstances. The following matters are pitfalls you should consider when you are drafting a dispute resolution clause.

 

Factors that may make the clause void and unenforceable:

 

Precondition to Court or other legal action

 

One of the biggest problems with ADR clauses arises when they set compliance with the ADR process as a pre-condition to seeking any court relief. This is problematic because it attempts to prevent the parties from approaching the Court when it has jurisdiction. If not properly drafted, these types of clauses can make the dispute resolution term unenforceable.

 

Words or phrases to look out for:

 

The parties must not seek any court orders until the parties have attended mediation.

 

Words or phrases that can prevent the clause being unenforceable:

 

Nothing in this clause X prevents the parties from seeking urgent or injunctive relief from the Court.

 

The key difference between these clauses is that the first tries to remove the jurisdiction of the Court by preventing the parties from seeking any relief from the Court until after the ADR processes have been complied with. This can result in some of the parties’ legal rights being wrongly enforced under the contract. For example, in cases where one party seeks to have recourse to security and the other party disputes this, the ADR process mechanisms may be too slow in resolving this dispute. Therefore, it is appropriate for the Court to be able to order urgent or injunctive relief to prevent recourse to the security. The parties can still have the underlying dispute proceed to the elected ADR process, but the security providing party may be able to (in the interim) prevent recourse where it is contested that the other party is not entitled to the benefit of that security.

 

Agreement to agree

 

A dispute resolution clause will be unenforceable if it is void for uncertainty. This often happens when there is an agreement to agree in a clause. For example, if a contract provides that the parties must agree on a matter and the parties are unable to reach an agreement, where do the parties stand in respect of their contractual duties? In the context of a dispute resolution clause, this can occur when the parties are required to agree on the form of the dispute process, or the appropriate body to determine the dispute or the rules that are to be applied to determine the dispute.

 

Words or phrases to look out for:

 

The parties must agree on an expert’ or ‘the parties must agree on the form of dispute process

 

Words or phrases that can prevent the clause being unenforceable:

 

The parties must agree on an expert. If the parties cannot agree, the expert shall be appointed or administered by the [for example] Australian Disputes Centre.’

 

The important difference between the two clauses is the second has a mechanism for resolving the uncertainty. If the parties cannot agree on which expert should be appointed, the clause provides for a third party to appoint or determine who the expert will be. Obviously, when nominating a third party to make the decision, it is important to confirm that the third party can and will appoint a dispute resolution professional.

 

Time frames should also be included as part of these clauses to avoid uncertainty. For example, a clause may state that parties are given 14 days to meet together to discuss the dispute before it proceeds to mediation. Without the 14 day timeframe, there is no clear indicator of when the parties are to engage in their dispute resolution process. A deeming mechanism should also be included to account for when the parties simply do not comply with the dispute resolution process. For instance, if the parties do not meet within 14 days, then the dispute should be automatically referred to mediation, or expert determination (as per the next tier of the agreed dispute resolution process) or simply allowed to proceed to litigation.

 

Broad and unclear drafting

 

The last pitfall of dispute resolution clauses discussed in this article is broad and/or unclear drafting. As a general problem with contracts, broad and/or unclear drafting can result in less certainty in the obligations between the parties. In the context of a dispute resolution clause, unclear drafting may occur in any of the following circumstances:

 

  • where there is not a clear process for a dispute to be resolved;
  • where the scope of the ADR powers and what can they determine is not defined;
  • where the rules that guide the ADR process are not clearly referenced; and
  • when can parties appeal the decision.

 

The consequence of broad and/or unclear drafting is that when a dispute arises, further disputes may occur when it comes time to interpret the clause. If a Court considers that the clause is uncertain and is unable to be properly interpreted, it may be held that the clause is void for uncertainty.

 

To assist with some of the considerations that arise with broad or unclear drafting, the next section of this article gives commentary on some of the considerations of ADR clauses so as to ensure your clause is suited to the parties and properly drafted.

 

Important Considerations in ADR clauses

 

Scope of ADR power

 

A dispute resolution clause can be customised by the parties. One way that parties can customise their dispute resolution clause is by determining what types of dispute will be resolved in which ways. For example, the parties may agree that technical matters to do with the scope of works or variations are unsuited to a determination by a legal professional. In such technical matters, the Courts will often have to consider expert reports from both parties, including any updates and responses from the experts. Even after considering the expert reports, the Court may nevertheless be unequipped or unsuitable to determine exactly what the correct outcome is or should be. Methods such as expert appraisal or expert determination can be effective ways of the parties reducing their costs and ensuring an appropriate resolution of the dispute. If this method is agreed by the parties, it is important to clearly set out exactly which disputes are to be resolved in which way. For example, the dispute resolution clause may state that any dispute involving a disputed variation or defective work that hinges on a technical interpretation must be resolved through expert determination. Accordingly, such a clause would also express that any dispute that hinges on legal interpretation be directed to a court of competent jurisdiction.

 

Statutory Provisions

 

When drafting a dispute resolution clause, it is important to consider whether there are any statutory provisions that may impact on the operation of the clause. For example, the Home Building Act 1989 (NSW) prevents the use of arbitration in some contracts for residential building work. In Victoria, the Building and Construction Industry Security of Payment Act 2002 (VIC) has an intricate regime for claimable variations in high value contracts (being contracts with a consideration over $5,000,000). These statutory provisions can have significant impacts on the clauses chosen by the parties. Further, while the Home Building Act prohibits the use of arbitration, the Victorian Security of Payment Act has consequences for the parties depending on the type of resolution used. It is important then to consider the statutory provisions and what their effects may be.

 

Binding or non-binding

 

A major consideration that parties should think about is whether to have the dispute resolution process as a binding or non-binding method. The Courts have generally held that where parties agree to a binding dispute resolution process, they will be unable to appeal the determination. While there may be circumstances where the parties can appeal to have the determination overturned, as a general rule, parties should expect to be bound by the decision. Therefore, parties should consider when they want to be bound by the decision of the dispute resolution professional.

 

Rights of appeal

 

While the process may be binding, the parties may agree to allow for appeal rights in the dispute resolution clause. For example, the parties may agree that a decision can be appealed where a party claims there has been a manifest error of law or where the amount in dispute exceeds a specified threshold. These mechanisms are interesting ways that parties can customise their dispute process and ensure that they are satisfied with the way any potential disputes will play out. It is important to consider any cost implications with appeal rights. While parties may not wish to be bound by a decision in certain circumstances, appeal rights may inevitably lead to higher costs in resolving a dispute.

 

 

Coronavirus (COVID-19) and Construction Contracts: What are your options?

Coronavirus (COVID19) and the construction industry: What are your options?

We recently published an article about how construction contracts can incorporate concepts of force majeure events. A copy of our article can be found here.

As the disruptions of corona virus begin to become more extensive with government mandates coming into effect, we believe it’s important for those in the construction industry to have a quick reference guide as to their options or important things to think about.

 

Pre-contract: Tendering, negotiating and drafting of contract
Force Majeure clause ·         Manages the relationship between the parties where there has been an ‘Act of God’ or other similar severely disrupting event

·         Depends on the contractual definition of the term

·         Generally, suspends the obligations until the force majeure event has concludes

·         Important to consider when the parties’ obligations will resume – what will indicate the end of the force majeure event

Scope of Works and mitigation of supply chain risk ·         Where possible, alternative supply or materials should be specified in the scope of works with pre-agreed variation prices
Extensions of Time ·         Can include force majeure event as a qualifying cause of delay

·         What circumstances can the contractor or subcontractor seek an EOT?

·         Generally appropriate for an EOT to be granted where there is suspension of works, variation, act, omission or breach of the other party, force majeure events and/or industrial action occurring across the relevant state or territory

·         Are there any duties to mitigate the delay which are a precondition to receiving an EOT

Delay Costs and/or damages ·         Does the contract provide for any delay costs or damages?

·         What are the circumstances that the contractor or subcontractor is entitled to costs and are there any relevant caps?

Legislative Provisions ·         How are the change in legislative requirement provisions worded?

·         Consider the definition of legislative requirement (and/or equivalent and related definitions)

·         Consider whether legislative provisions should include a carve out for where there is a change in the legislative requirements in relation to COVID19. Given the uncertainty around how the government will proceed, it is difficult to predict how the legislative regimes or executive orders will change as the response to COVID changes and adapts

Labour and Key Personnel ·         Are there any key personnel of the contractor or the subcontractor that should be specifically identified?

·         Are there specific measures the Principal/Contractor want to specifically implement? Examples may include split teams

Security ·         Consider what types of security will protect against insolvency risk of contractors or subcontractors – Parent guarantee, retention monies, material security and/or bank guarantees

·         Consider circumstances where there may be recourse to the security such as where a party becomes insolvent or there are defective works that require rectification

·         Consider Principal security for payment if there are any solvency concerns

Insurance ·         Principals should consider whether there are suitable insurance policies to protect from any delays to the works or any consequences that the delays may have at the end of the project

·         For example, Principals may wish to discuss delay in start-up insurance with their insurance broker

Warranty deeds and defects ·         Principals may wish to require warranty deeds from the subcontractors to insure against any insolvency risk from contractors and to allow for any defects to be rectified independent of the contractor
Financial capacity of the tenders ·         When assessing potential contractors, Principals should consider the financial capacity of contractors and whether there are any solvency concerns and if there are any parent companies that can provide guarantees
Project deadlines ·         What deadlines are imposed by related contracts such as sale of land for off the plan properties

·         How long are the deadlines and timeframes of the project? Can they be extended to account for coronavirus

Contract structures ·         Profit/cost-saving sharing models of contract or guaranteed maximum price may be considered by Principals to minimise cost exposure of contracts that may be affected by coronavirus (such as supply chain risk)
Contract administration
Extension of time ·         Principals and Superintendents generally have the power to issue an EOT even when a claim may not be made by the Contractor. While they are not obliged to use this power for the benefit of the contractor, there may be practical and goodwill benefits in using these powers

·         Contractors should seek legal advice in terms of the relevant EOT clause and whether they have a right to seek an EOT or what other options are available to them under the contract

Suspension ·         Suspension is generally a grounds for an EOT

·         Consider who bears the cost of suspension under the contract

·         Is there a right for the contractor to claim any suspension costs or costs associated

Change to legislative requirements ·         In the event of government mandated shutdown, there is likely going to be claims for legislative changes. These will largely depend on the wording of the clauses, who bears the risk on legislative changes and the form of the government shut down

·         Other considerations include whether construction work is considered an essential service and to what extent

Variations ·         Where there is a supply chain breakdown due to closed borders, there may be claims for variations being made by Principals or Contractors to allow the project to continue

·         Variations will be linked to the scope of work and whether there are alternatives that can be sourced

Payments ·         Principals may wish to change payment terms to accommodate contractors or subcontractors

·         As the effects of coronavirus move throughout the economy, there will undoubtedly be businesses that struggle and become insolvent. Where possible, Principals may want to consider changing milestone payments or frequency of payment claims to assist contractors’ cashflows

·         Any agreement between the Principal and relevant contractor should be evidenced in writing

Acceleration ·         If there is relatively small amount of work left, Principals may consider giving directions to accelerate

·         While this may increase the cost of the project, the Principal may be able to ensure the project is completed before shutdowns come into effect

Employment ·         Employment law advice should be sought about how to manage employee relationships while projects are on hold by reason of coronavirus
Teams and social distancing ·         Head contractors may wish to implement policies that flow down the contracting chain in relation to splitting teams and social distancing where possible
Other arrangements agreed between the parties ·         Sometimes the best changes are those made between the parties and not from the lawyers

·         However, even where this is the case, ensure that such agreements are evidenced in writing and you seek legal advice on the impacts of the agreement and whether there are any potential consequences that you may not have considered

Other issues
Financiers ·         In many developments, there may be a financier involved and different obligations that arise under these loans and security documents

·         Principals should consider their obligations to notify their financier(s) where appropriate

Other stakeholders ·         There may be a range of other stakeholders that may have an interest in the construction contracts

·         It is important to manage these aspects of the development to reduce or eliminate any potential problems later on

Dispute resolution
SOPA claims ·         At the time of writing, there have been no changes to the strict deadlines imposed on submitting and responding to payment claims under the NSW Security of Payment legislation

·         SOPA is a contractor friendly forum, allowing for money to flow down the contracting chain

·         SOPA claims can be challenged on jurisdictional grounds or can be settled at the end of the contract if there has been an overpayment

Alternative dispute resolutions ·         Many alternative dispute resolution professionals are not taking new appointments. This can create a delay in parties complying with the relevant dispute resolution clauses

·         Parties may consider teleconferences or videoconferences to resolve disputes, rather than physically meeting

Courts ·         Many courts are operating via videoconferencing, with physical appearances limited

·         The court process may have more delays than usual as judges and parties adjust to the temporary measures of case management

·         Where a party is seeking urgent injunctive or other relief, it is important to seek legal advice as soon as possible to ensure that an application can be made efficiently and protect your interests

Contract termination ·         If you are seeking to terminate the contract it is important to terminate in accordance with the contractual provisions and to consider any common law rights or duties in relation to termination

·         Those seeking to terminate where the counterparty has become insolvent will also need to be aware of the recent insolvency changes and the restrictions on terminating pursuant to insolvency

 

 

Prevailing in a “Battle of the Forms”

Late last year Bradbury Legal was successful in representing its client in the case of Samios Plumbing Pty Ltd v John R Keith (QLD) Pty Ltd [2019] QDC 237 (29 November 2019). The case related to a “Battle of the Forms” where the Court found that our client’s terms and conditions governed the relationship between the parties for the supply of goods, rather than the purported terms and conditions of the other party.

The Facts

Samios Plumbing Pty Ltd (Samios) sent John R Keith (QLD) Pty Ltd (JRK) their standard credit application form used to establish a credit facility. This was not an offer capable of acceptance but an invitation to treat. In February 2010, JRK sent a facsimile to Samios enclosing a cover letter, Samios’ completed credit application form as amended by JRK’s financial controller and JRK’s standard terms and conditions.

Samios’ credit application included the sentence “All goods shall be sold in accordance with the “STANDARD TERMS AND CONDITIONS” as outlined on the purchase Invoice”. This sentence was struck out and initialled by JRK’s financial controller.

Later that month, JRK received a letter from Samios stating that its credit application had been approved and JRK subsequently placed orders.

JRK contended that the credit application (accompanied by JRK’s standard terms and conditions) was an offer to enter into an agreement for the future supply of goods on credit. The amendment to Samios’ credit application meant that JRK’s offer excluded Samios’ standard terms and conditions and substituted them with JRK’s standard terms and conditions. As such, JRK argued that Samios’ letter accepted that offer and all goods supplied by Samios were subject to JRK’s standard terms and conditions.

Samios denied that the credit application was an offer to enter into such an agreement. It contended that the credit application was a request that Samios extend credit to JRK for future orders and that each purchase order from JRK was a separate offer to purchase goods. For this reason, Samios contended that all goods were supplied with a delivery docket that referred to its standard terms and conditions available on its website and that JRK accepted each offer by taking delivery of the goods.

Decision

Barlow QC of the District Court of Queensland found that:

  • it was clear from JRK sending the credit application to Samios with its standard terms and conditions that it was an offer by JRK to enter into a contract for the provision of credit for the purchase of goods in the future;
  • by striking out Samios’ term that all purchases be made on Samios’ terms and conditions and including a copy of JRK’s own terms and conditions, JRK was offering to enter into a credit agreement on its own terms and conditions;
  • Samios’ letter approving JRK’s credit application, clearly conveyed to any reasonable business person, that Samios was accepting JRK’s offer to contract on the terms stated (i.e. JRK’s standard terms and conditions); and
  • thus, the credit agreement between JRK and Samios governed the terms of all subsequent orders and supplies of goods between the parties.

His Honour also considered Samios’ submission that the provision of a delivery docket with each order which made reference to Samios’ terms and conditions constituted an offer to supply goods on those terms. His Honour determined that the delivery dockets were not an offer to enter into a contract on Samios’ terms and conditions. Rather, as JRK’s orders were made using its own purchase order form and included a copy of JRK’s standard terms and conditions, by Samios’ conduct in delivering the goods in accordance with the purchase orders, Samios’ accepted JRK’s standard terms and conditions as governing the purchase order.

Key Takeaways

The scenario described above is not uncommon. Another example of where a ‘Battle of the Forms’ can arise is where a party provides a quotation that is subject to its standard terms and conditions and then the other party provides a purchase order stating that its own standard terms and conditions apply.

To avoid the ambiguity that these scenarios create and to minimise the chances of being involved in a costly dispute, it is important that it is clear which terms and conditions govern the relationship between the parties. The case law demonstrates that if parties proceed without agreeing on which terms and conditions apply, usually it will be determined that the last terms and conditions to be exchanged govern the relationship. While in these circumstances there is no express acceptance by a party of the offer of the terms provided by the other party, the court can find that there has been acceptance by conduct.

A worthwhile consideration if you are entering into an ongoing relationship that will involve multiple transactions is an “umbrella” or “master” agreement that sets out the terms and conditions that will apply to the future orders and supplies.

If you or someone you know wants more information or needs help or advice about avoiding a “Battle of the Forms”, please contact us on +61 2 9248 3450 or email info@bradburylegal.com.au

A copy of the case can be found here:

http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/viewdoc/au/cases/qld/QDC/2019/237.html?context=1;query=john%20r%20keith;mask_path=

 

 

The Parties’ Minds over Matter: terminated contract versus quantum meruit

The High Court of Australia has recently handed down a rare and significant judgment in the area of building and construction law.
A story that began with the construction of two townhouses in Victoria has led to the shaking of the foundations of the law around contract, repudiation and claiming a quantum meruit.
This decision affects the common situation in which a builder and a developer have a torn-up contract, and the builder is claiming payment for the work they started but were not able to finish.
We explore Mann v Paterson Constructions Pty Ltd [2019] HCA 32 below and provide an overview of the key takeaways from this ruling in relation to quantum meruit.
The High Court also considered some interpretation issues in relation to the Victorian Domestic Building Contract Act 1995. These are not considered here.

Quantum meruit

Before analysing the case, it is useful to outline what is a claim for quantum meruit.
A claim for quantum meruit, is a claim for a fair and reasonable sum for services rendered, where a developer requests and receives a benefit from a builder.
This is not a claim in contract, which is a claim by Party A to be given that which Party B promised or agreed to give.

Where a contract is still alive between the parties, a claim for quantum meruit is not permitted. Some of the situations in which a claim in quantum meruit may be brought include:
(a) a contract never existed between the parties;
(b) statute prevents a claim in contract, because for example the agreement was for residential building work but it was not in writing; or
(c) a contract was in existence but was void or unenforceable.

Case (c) above was the subject of Mann v Paterson Constructions. In this case, the contract was terminated, so it no longer applied between the parties.
An issue that has been plaguing courts for some time is the following: in a claim for quantum meruit, what if a “fair and reasonable sum” for services performed is greater than what the parties agreed to under the contract? Should the claim be limited to what was agreed to by the parties, even if that agreement was ripped up?
It was an inevitable prize fight between contract and quantum meruit, with a purse of several hundred thousand dollars at stake.

The facts

On 4 March 2014, Peter and Angela Mann (the Manns) entered into a Masters Builders Association domestic building contract (Contract) with Paterson Constructions Pty Ltd (Paterson). Under the Contract, Paterson was to build two double-storey townhouses in Blackburn, Victoria. The Manns were to pay Paterson the amount of $970,000 (incl. GST). During the performance of the Contract, the Manns requested 42 variations without giving the required written notice. Paterson performed these variations.
On 16 April 2015, a little over one year into the project, the relationship between the parties had deteriorated, primarily over claims that variations had been completed and had to be paid.
The Manns through their solicitors wrote to Paterson, stating that they considered the contract to have been repudiated by Paterson. Repudiation occurs where a party demonstrates that it is unwilling or unable to perform important parts of the contract. The Manns “accepted” this repudiation and said that they terminated the Contract.
Paterson denied that its conduct had been repudiatory. After some correspondence, Paterson claimed that the Manns’ purported termination was in fact repudiation by the Manns. Paterson said that as a result, it terminated the Contract.

The case history: from VCAT to the High Court
Paterson commenced proceedings in the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal, seeking damages.
Senior Member Walker of VCAT found that the Manns had wrongfully repudiated the contract. Paterson was awarded damages on a quantum meruit. Once rectification of defects was considered, damages were $660,526.41.
The remarkable aspect of the ruling was that the damages awarded to Patterson for quantum meruit were much higher than the contract price that Paterson would have been entitled to had the Contract remained alive. Senior Member Walker was acutely aware of this, but considered the damages to be a fair and reasonable sum.
The Manns appealed first to the Supreme Court of Victoria, however Cavanough J dismissed the appeal. The Manns then appealed to the Court of Appeal.
The Manns argued that the decision-makers had made an error. They argued that the error was that the decision-makers had decided that where a contract is terminated, it is as though it never existed and, as a result, they did not have to consider the costs actually incurred by the builder carrying out the work or the discrepancy between the amount awarded and the contract price.
The Court of Appeal also dismissed this appeal, ruling that only the High Court could overturn a principle that was said to be well-established. Not to be swayed, the Manns embarked on this challenged and took their case to the High Court.

The High Court judgment

All seven judges allowed the appeal. After two unsuccessful appeals, the third and last appeal by the Manns was a success.
The seven judges accepted that the law as currently interpreted had to be corrected.
Three judges refused to allow a claim on a quantum meruit where a contract between the parties had been terminated.
The four other judges accepted that a claim for quantum meruit could be made in limited circumstances: where work was commenced but not completed at the time of termination. However, any claim for quantum meruit was limited by the contract price that was agreed to by the parties.
Where the contract required the principal to pay only once for the “entire” work and labour performed by the contractor, and the contract is terminated before completion, then the contractor will be able to claim for all of the work it completed on a quantum meruit. This is because at the time of termination, the contractor had not yet accrued the contractual “right” to be paid – it had not completed all of the work.
However, the situation was different for the case of the Manns. Under their Contract, the principal was required to pay separate sums upon completion of certain stages of the work and labour. Paterson had fully completed some of these stages, while there was at least one stage which remained incomplete at the time of termination.
The majority decided that for completed stages, these could only be claimed under the contract, and damages would be assessed by reference to the contract price. It was only the incomplete stage that could be claimed on a quantum meruit.
The other important finding by the majority was that the amount to be claimed on a quantum meruit should not in the ordinary case exceed a fair value calculated in accordance with the contract price. This judgment left open the possibility of exceptions, including for example where constant breaches by a principal resulted in a huge cost overrun by the builder.
The Court was at pains to point out that, where a contract is still alive between the parties, parties cannot claim on a quantum meruit for a reasonable sum for the services rendered. The parties made an agreement that is still enforceable. That is all that courts will enforce.
What the decision did not resolve was the common case where a contract provides for progress payments, which are made on account only and are not final entitlements. This issue might be before the superior courts before long.
Conclusion

In some very complicated and differing judgments, the High Court has given a lot of clarity to an issue that has clouded the minds of lawyers, tribunal members and judges alike.
Builders and developers should be aware that even if there is no contract, where work is requested by developer and completed by a contractor, there will be a good case for a claim for damages.
Where a contract existed between parties at some point, this will be a significant factor in calculating the amount of damages, even where it is terminated.
If you or someone you know wants more information or needs help or advice, please contact us on +61 2 9248 3450 or email info@bradburylegal.com.au

Expertly building evidence: Lessons learned from White Constructions

Case note: White Constructions Pty Ltd v PBS Holdings Pty Ltd [2019] NSWSC 1166

In White Constructions, Hammerschlag J considered the issue of delay damages. White Constructions was the property developer of a site in Kiama NSW. The development involved the development and subdivision of 100 lots and required design and installation of sewer infrastructure. These works required a s 73 Certificate issued by Sydney Water before subdivision could occur. White Constructions appointed the Defendants to assist with the design and approval works needed as part of the development and resulting subdivision. A substantial part of the judgment was devoted to the preparing and designing of the sewer designs and the approval of Sydney Water, including the different types of sewage systems, Sydney Water’s preference in relation to these systems, preparation of option reports and correspondence between the Superintendent, the Defendants and Sydney Water.

The discussions between Sydney Water, the Superintendent and the Defendants took considerable time. As a result, White Constructions alleged that the delay in coming to the approved sewage design caused White Constructions to be liable to their building contractor for delay damages. In arguing the substance of the dispute, the parties tendered complex expert evidence. As a result, the Court appointed an expert to assist in interpreting and assessing the expert evidence presented.

With the expert’s assistance, Hammerschlag J criticised the experts’ approach to determining the delays attributable to the sewage works. Both experts used methods derived from the United Kingdom Society of Construction Law, the Delay and Disruption Protocol (the Protocol) in analysing the delay. The Protocol identifies six different methods of delay analysis, but Hammerschlag J held that the inclusion of a delay analysis method in the Protocol does not necessarily mean it should be used. While the Protocol methods have been endorsed in other cases, the analysis of delay must pay close attention to the actual evidence of what was happening on the ground of the project. The delay analysis must show and prove that, on the balance of probabilities, the delay:
• played a role in delaying the project;
• how it delayed the project; and
• how much it delayed the project.

This approach is in line with the common law common-sense approach to causation which the High Court referred to in March v E&MH Stramare Pty Ltd (1991) 171 CLR 506.

A lot of value in White Constructions comes from Hammerschlag J’s analysis of what evidence is needed in cases where delay is alleged in construction matters. Firstly, the Court stated that close attention must be paid to the facts of the matter, rather than the opinion of experts. This evidence should not be general in nature, but specific in that it is able to precisely identify delays in the project. This evidence should be a contemporaneous record of the project. A classic example of this kind of evidence is a site diary which records the day to day of the project, as well as specific cause and effect of each delay.
• what works were undertaken/completed;
• the instructions received from the client;
• the delays/any complaints of delays and how they have affected other activities;
• which personnel were onsite; and
• any other relevant details

The Court found that it was important that the contemporaneous record identified which activities were adversely affected by the delays. For example, if the works of one contractor were delayed and, as a result, caused delay for another contractor, the site diary should record these details. Failing to record these details means that it is harder, if not near impossible, for parties to establish that there was in fact a causal link and adverse effect.

How does White Constructions impact a project?

White Constructions shows the importance of proper project documentation. Most importantly, the site diary, or similar contemporaneous document, should be the primary record of the specific of what is happening on site and how specific events affect different contractors. Proper record keeping, while it may be administratively burdensome, allows the Court to analyse and determine the proper entitlements of the parties if the project ever comes into dispute. While other evidence can be adduced in pursuit of proving delay, it runs the risk of being generalist in nature and not enough to prove the causal link of the delays.

The lessons learned in White Constructions may also have some application in respect of other delay related mechanisms under construction contracts. For example, a comprehensive site diary would also be useful in determining any claim for an EOT claim. However, it is important to note that these types of claims are largely determined by the contract and its processes for determining what is in fact an EOT. Nevertheless, contemporaneous records of what has happened and how this has affected the project is useful in establishing a claim by a party as to their entitlements.
Another important point that comes from White Constructions is ensuring experts are given the proper lay evidence to ensure that they can properly opine on the project. While it does not displace the role of lay evidence such as site diaries, it can assist in assisting the Court in considering and making appropriate decisions on what the parties are entitled to.

If you or someone you know wants more information or needs help or advice, please contact us on +61 2 9248 3450 or email info@bradburylegal.com.au.

What’s in a name?: The Supreme Court Reviews ambiguity in SoPA Payment Claims

Those who are familiar with the Building and Construction Industry Security of Payment Act 1999 (‘the Act’) will likely be aware that the provisions it contains are quite strict, and can leave parties out in the cold when they fail to comply with what are seemingly administrative oversights.

However, the overarching purpose of the Act is ultimately to keep money flowing through the construction system, aimed at ensuring those who perform building and construction works, or supply goods and services to construction projects are able to be paid.

The Supreme Court of New South Wales, in the recent decision of decision Modog Pty Ltd v ZS Constructions (Queenscliff) Pty Ltd [2019] NSWSC 1743 reminded parties of this fact when asked to turn its mind to issues of ambiguity in payment claims and whether a party could be allowed to have an adjudication determination quashed on the basis of technicalities.

The Facts

The facts of the case were reasonably clear and did not form a substantial component of the dispute between the parties. In September 2016, Modog Pty Ltd (‘Modog’) entered into a design and construct head contract with Wyndora 36 Pty Ltd (‘Wyndora’) for the development of senior living apartments at a property located along Wyndora Avenue in Freshwater. Modog then entered a sub-contract with ZS Constructions (Queenscliff) Pty Limited (ZS Queenscliff) for the demolition of the existing structure and the construction of the new seniors living complex, including apartments, basement parking and associated site works (‘the Sub-Contract’).

In March 2018, the Sub-contract was varied to engage ZS Queenscliff to provide Construction Management and procurement services, for which ZS Queenscliff would receive a project manager’s allowance, a contract administrator’s allowance and payments for subcontractors and suppliers to be made at the end of each month.

ZS Queenscliff was part of a wider group of entities, which also included ZS Constructions (Australia) Pty Ltd (‘ZS Australia’) and Zaarour Investments Pty Ltd had been engaged as the project manager for the project. Mr Christopher Zaarour was employed by ZS Queenscliff, was the director of ZS Constructions Pty Ltd and was the primary contact with Modog for the duration of the project.

The further sub-contracts on the project were administered by ZS Queenscliff, however invoices from sub-contractors had historically been issued to a mixture of Modog, Wyndora and ZS Australia, as opposed to ZS Queenscliff. During the course of the project, ZS Queenscliff and Modog adopted a progress payments process in which Mr Zaarour would, on behalf of ZS Queenscliff, prepare and email a payment summary sheet listing all amounts due for procurement and management services, as well as materials acquired, and work completed by trade contractors.

On 29 August 2019, Modog issued a Show Cause Notice to ZS Queenscliff and terminated the Sub-contract on 13 September 2019.

The Payment Claim and Adjudication

On 11 September 2019, ZS Queenscliff served a payment claim on Modog which was comprised of seven emails, from Mr Zaarour using an email signature from Zaarour Sleiman and containing a reference to ZS Australia in fine print at the bottom of the email.

The emails attached supporting invoices from suppliers, and followed the process adopted in earlier progress payments, where sub-contractors and suppliers had addressed their invoices to a mixture of the entities involved with the project, and not to ZS Queenscliff, who were issuing the payment claim.

The payment claim served on Modog was, as highlighted by the Court, unclear in the following respects:

  • It did not specifically assert that it was a progress payment claim under the Act;
  • It did not specify the reference date or refer to the clause within the contract upon which the progress payment was based;
  • It failed to ask Modog to pay ZS Queenscliff;
  • It did not include a total for the sum claimed, only determinable by a thorough review of the claims

Modog, in turn responded to the payment claim with payment schedules which certified the amount payable in respect of the Claim was nil.

The matter proceeded to an adjudication, where, on 23 October 2019, the adjudicator found in favour of ZS Queenscliff in the sum of $89,111.89 (GST incl.).

Modog challenged the decision of the adjudicator before the Supreme Court of Sydney, seeking orders that the Adjudication Determination of be deemed void, that the determination be quashed, and ancillary relief.

The Disputed Issues

At the hearing, Modog challenged the decision of the adjudicator on 3 primary grounds:

  • Whether the 11 September 2019 emails constituted a payment claim within the meaning of s13(1) of the Act;
  • If the emails did constitute a payment claim, whether the claim was sent by ZS Queenscliff as a person who was entitled to seek a determination for the purposes of s17 of the Act; and
  • Whether the Adjudicator has committed a jurisdictional error by allowing multiple payment claims in respect of a single reference date?

The Arguments, Decision and Reasoning

Issue 1: Was there a Payment Claim:

The argument advanced by Modog was effectively, ZS Queenscliff had not submitted a valid payment claim as they did not specifically demand payment from Modog (i.e.: did not say, Modog must pay ZS Queenscliff the sum of $X.). Modog relied on the fact that the invoices provided in support of the payment claim, were addressed to various entities, not ZS Queenscliff, and that ZS Queenscliff could not establish they were actually entitled to the money claimed for.

Modog argued that ZS Queenscliff had indicated invoices would be sent at a later time, which Modog was to pay as directed and that, pursuant to the Court’s decision in Quickway Constructions Pty Ltd v Electrical Energy Pty Ltd, ZS Queenscliff had not served a payment claim pursuant to clause 13(1) of the Act.

The counter argument raised by ZS Queenscliff relied upon the case of Icon Co NSW Pty Ltd v Australia Avenue Developments Pty Ltd [2018] to support their position that Modog had simply misunderstood the payment claim, and that this could not be a basis for quashing the adjudicator’s decision. ZS Queenscliff argued the fact that the invoices were addressed to other parties did not invalidate the payment claim as they were simply disbursements to be paid to suppliers.

Ultimately, the Court favoured the position raised by ZS Queenscliff, noting there is nothing within the Act that requires a payment claim to state the total of the sum claimed. The Court stated and that even if the invoices in support of the payment did require Modog to direct payment elsewhere, as long as ZS Queenscliff had an entitlement to the sum under the contract, this did not invalidate the payment claim itself.

Issue 2: Was the Payment Claim Sent by ZS Queenscliff?

Modog then raised the issue that, as the 11 September 2019 email enclosing the payment claim was sent by Mr. Zaarour, using an email signature that did not belong to ZS Queenscliff, and the only legal entity named in the email was ZS Australia, the payment claim had not been served by the appropriate entity for the purposes of s17 of the Act.

The counter argument raised by ZS Queenscliff was that these errors were irrelevant in light of the fact that the previous correspondence between the parties had been exchanged in much the same way, including when detailing the terms of the caries contract agreements, and the point was not taken at the contract negotiation stage.

The Court ultimately agreed again with ZS Queenscliff, making the point that not was not actually disputed that ZS Queenscliff was entitled to make the payment claim and made the determination that the email payment claim had simply been sent by Mr Zaarrour in his capacity as the project manager, on behalf of ZS Queenscliff.

Issue 3: Was there an issue with multiple emails being used to comprise the payment claim?

Finally, Modog sought to raise the point that multiple invoices had been served on them in the emails from ZS Queenscliff and that it was not open for ZS Queenscliff to seek to have all invoices adjudicated.

Relying on the decision of the court in Rail Corporations of NSW v Nebax Constructions [2012] NSWSC6, this point ultimately failed as well, on the basis that, when viewed in the context of the previous conduct between the parties, and the nature of the invoices supplied, Modog had been more accurately provided with one payment claim, and a number of invoices in support of the claim.

What does this decision mean?

This decision serves as a timely reminder to parties that the Building and Construction Industry Security of Payment Act 1999 (‘the Act’) is intended to allow money to flow through to sub-contractors. Parties should be mindful of this purpose when considering whether to attempt to argue a payment claim on the basis of a minor technicality or ambiguity.

If you or someone you know wants more information or needs help or advice in relation to NSW’s security of payment legislation (or any other state’s or territory’s equivalent), please contact us on (02) 9248 3450 or email info@bradburylegal.com.au.

See more! The superintendent and the principal

To those working at building sites, the term “superintendent” may seem as familiar and self-explanatory as “extension of time” or “practical completion”.

However, when disputes arise fine distinctions become important. Even experienced builders, just like experienced judges, have trouble working out what the superintendent is required to do in contentious times.

This is because the superintendent has multiple duties to different parties. They have the difficult job of navigating conflicting interests, and this becomes much harder when the relationship between the principal and contractor has deteriorated.

Although the precise duties of a superintendent will always depend on the terms of the contract, we will describe in general terms some obligations that participants in a building project must be aware of. We will also take a real-life case study to illustrate some of these points.

The role

Sometimes called “contract administrator” or “architect”, the superintendent’s precise role will vary as it is largely determined by the terms of the contract between the principal and the contractor. The parties may agree by contract to restrict or widen the superintendent’s functions, and courts will generally allow this.

However, there are a number of general commonalities to this role across different projects. In most cases, the superintendent has a dual role or function:

  1. On the one hand, the superintendent will often be the agent of the principal, and will perform functions on behalf of the principal such as issuing directions to the contractor, varying the scope, of works, making approvals, or receiving notices;
  2. On the other hand, the superintendent will often be responsible for certifying, assessing and valuing items under the contract, including progress claims, extension of time claims, liquidated damages, and practical completion.

The principal is required to ensure that for the second set of functions above, the superintendent act “honestly and fairly” (or otherwise, “reasonably and in good faith”).

Often this is an obligation to exercise impartial and independent judgment, and to reach a decision without taking improper considerations into account. They should afford procedural fairness to both parties, giving notice of the issues it is considering and allowing both parties to communicate to them their submissions.

In general, for these second set of functions, the interests of not only the Principal, but also those of the Contractor, must be considered. All too often, superintendents fail to understand their obligations of independence and this triggers court proceedings.

In practice, this dual role can be complicated. Superintendents are generally appointed by the principal. They are very often either a part of a firm consulting to the principal, or they are an employee of the principal. Even if there is no pressure exerted by the principal, they are paid by the principal. Exercising their judgment impartially in this context can be very challenging.

A superintendent is not a party to the contract. It is unlikely that they will themselves be the subject of court proceedings. However, their decisions may give rise to disputes as between the principal and contractor.

Case Study

The New South Wales Court of Appeal has given some guidance for what is considered appropriate action by a superintendent under a construction contract, in the case Peninsula Balmain Pty Ltd v Abigroup Contractors Pty Ltd [2002] NSWCA 211.

Peninsula and Abigroup entered into an AS2124 building contract. Abigroup sought payment of a progress claim. The following month, Peninsula issued a notice to Abigroup requiring Abigroup to show cause that a contractual right to terminate should not be exercised, and cross-claimed for liquidated damages under the contract.

In response, Abigroup moved to terminate the contract, claiming that Peninsula had breached the then Trade Practices Act (which has since integrated into the broader Australian Consumer Law), for failing to disclose an agency agreement for design and construction projects between Peninsula and the superintendent.

The Court considered the whether Peninsula contravened the Trade Practices Act for failing to disclose to Abigroup the agency agreement with the superintendent?

On appeal, Hodgson JA held:

“the superintendent is the owner’s agent in all matters only in a very loose sense, and that, when exercising certifying functions in respect of which the superintendent must act honestly and impartially, the superintendent is not acting as the owner’s agent, in the strict legal sense.”

The Court concluded that the superintendent is to exercise their power in the interests of both parties and, is to act honestly and impartially and not as an agent of the owner in undertaking certifying functions such as assessments of variations, delays and progress claims.

There was also an argument that the superintendent should have but failed to exercise its power to award an extension of time. It was common ground that Peninsula Balmain had caused delay, but that Abigroup had not applied for the extension of time or followed the proper procedure. However, the extension of time clause included a paragraph that read: “Notwithstanding that the Contractor is not entitled to an extension of time the Superintendent may at any time and from time to time before the issue of the Final Certificate by notice in writing to the Contractor extend the time for Practical Completion for any reason.”

Hodgson JA found that, even though Abigroup had not applied for the extension of time, “this power is one capable of being exercised in the interests both of the owner and the builder, and in my opinion the Superintendent is obliged to act honestly and impartially in deciding whether to exercise this power”. In the facts of the case, the finding was that if the superintendent had acted fairly and impartially, they would have awarded the extension of time. The date for practical completion was extended, and liquidated damages were reduced.

This ruling was dependent on the particular extension of time clause of the case, and the facts of the dispute. However, it powerfully reinforces the point that even though the superintendent is the agent of the principal, they are obliged to act honestly and fairly in discharging certain functions, unless the contract says otherwise.

Conclusion:

In conclusion, the role of a superintendent is very demanding and requires a high level of understanding of contract law, the responsibilities, the specifics of the project, and a high skill of identifying and managing conflicts. If you have any queries about your obligations under a construction contract, please contact us on +61 2 9248 3450 or email info@bradburylegal.com.au